Executive summary

Many American electoral reform campaigners champion proportional ranked choice voting. This is because proportional RCV (known internationally as single transferable vote) can mitigate many of the problems facing American democracy. These include government dysfunction, negative campaigning, gerrymandering, the influence of money in politics, and the underrepresentation of minority communities. This paper examines the events and motivations that drove change in Australia, and identifies lessons that could be instructive for reformers in the United States. Australia’s adoption of proportional RCV for Senate elections provides a particularly relevant example for American reformers due to the similarity in both countries’ constitutions. 

• The movement for proportional ranked choice voting (RCV) in Australia offers important lessons for American reformers.
• Proportional RCV supporters forged key alliances with other reform movements of the early 20th Century. 
• Politicians on both the center-right and center-left supported proportional representation, especially when they realized it was in their self-interest.
• Australia’s constitutional structure and elite self-interest helped catalyze reform. 
• American reformers should build support for proportional RCV early, so that it has strong backing when a window for change opens.

Early support at the country’s founding

At Australia’s constitutional conventions, Senate proportional RCV was presented as a means to achieve women’s representation and protect the interests of small states against large parties accountable to national organizations.

In the 1890s, there was strong support for writing proportional RCV for Senate elections into the Australian Constitution, then being debated and drafted. At times, senior founders at the constitutional conventions (Barton and Deakin) reported that adoption of proportional RCV was a near certainty. 

Still, the Senate electoral system proved particularly controversial. Diverging ideas about the legitimate role and power of the Senate bore an array of preferred methods for selecting its members. Many wanted an elected and powerful second chamber with the democratic legitimacy to block, not just delay and suggest amendments to, legislation. However, others were uneasy about the prospect of a government responsible to one chamber being thwarted by another. They saw this as counter to Westminster traditions, and instead envisioned a Senate comprising party elders appointed for life terms, similar to the Canadian Senate. Some thought such Senators (unaccountable to a popular electorate or to party organizations) would be well placed to conduct relatively impartial investigations and make wise recommendations. 

Within the successful “powerful Senate” camp, there were also fierce disagreements. It was clear that the Senate would have to provide equal representation to each state; otherwise, colonies with small populations like Tasmania, Western Australia, South Australia, and Queensland would withhold their consent. Even more contentious were proposed Senator selection methods. 

A significant minority, inspired by Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No.59, wanted a decentralized system of government with Senators elected by state parliaments. Many within this faction also wanted each state’s delegation to speak and act as one for the majority interests of their state, and thus thought that each state’s delegation should have a single vote.

Many from the smaller states rejected these ideas, and were inclined toward using a form of proportional representation (PR) to elect Senators. They foresaw the development of a Senate in which loyalty to parties would trump state interests (particularly when a single party held a majority). Such a Senate would become a rubber stamp for the governing party in the lower chamber when it controlled both houses. This was especially likely if Senators were elected using winner-take-all block voting. A weak Senate meant political decisions would run roughshod over the interests of smaller states.

The late 19th Century also saw an alliance form between suffragettes and PR campaigners. This alliance was embodied in Catherine Helen Spence, a Scottish-born suffragette and PR advocate from Adelaide, South Australia. She was thoroughly versed in the theories and ideas of Thomas Hare (the main intellect behind proportional RCV) and John Stuart Mill (Hare’s friend and proportional RCV supporter). She traveled around Australia and abroad, giving lectures on women’s suffrage and proportional electoral systems. While deeply invested in both causes, she famously argued that proportional RCV was more important than even women’s voting rights.After women won the right to vote in South Australia, Spence ran as a candidate for the 1897-98 Constitutional Convention on a platform of “a just system of representation.” Though she narrowly lost her campaign, she and her supporters had a substantial impact on convention debates, in which delegates spoke on her behalf. The South Australian and Tasmanian delegations were the most supportive of proportional RCV. Indeed, proportional RCV had been adopted by Tasmania for colonial lower house elections in 1896, on a trial basis. At that time, it was used in just two districts: in Hobart to elect six members of Parliament (MPs) and in Launceston to elect four.

A missed constitutional opportunity

A constitutional provision allowing the federal Parliament to choose its own electoral system delayed reform by half a century.

After much debate, it was determined that Section 9 of Australia’s Constitution would allow the federal Parliament to legislate for a nationwide “manner of voting” for the federal House and Senate. Consequently, only for the first Australian election did each state select its own method of voting for federal officials. Tasmania chose proportional RCV for the 1901 federal House and Senate elections.

Australia’s first Prime Minister, Sir Edmund Barton, attempted to legislate single-winner ranked choice voting (aka instant runoff voting) for House elections and proportional RCV for Senate elections, but this was rejected by the Senate. The Australian Parliament then legislated the use of single-choice voting (aka first-past-the-post) for House elections and plurality block voting for Senate elections. Although supporters of PR had suffered a defeat, they were not willing to abandon their reform agenda. In 1907, Tasmania adopted proportional RCV for state lower house elections, and single-winner RCV for state upper house elections. The first Tasmania state election in which proportional RCV was used statewide was 1909.

Royal commissions are ill timed

World War I and the Great Depression diverted attention away from government reports advocating for electoral reform.

Australia initially had a three-party system, with the Australian Labor Party, the Free Trade Party, and the Protectionist Party. This, plus divergent state voting patterns, masked the vulnerability of plurality block voting to single-party representation in the Senate. However, in 1909, the Protectionists and Free Traders merged to form the first Australian Liberal Party. Australia then had a two-party system. In 1910, the Labor Party won all contested Australian Senate seats. From then until the adoption of proportional RCV in 1949, Senate elections resembled a windscreen wiper effect: Small changes in the vote would deliver all Senate seats in a state to a single party.

Like Barton before him, Prime Minister Joseph Cook was a proponent of proportional RCV for Senate elections. In January 1914, he established a Royal Commission on “Commonwealth Electoral Law and Administration.” The Commission’s 1915 report recommended the adoption of proportional RCV. However, Cook’s Liberal government lost the September 1914 election to the Labor Party, and the recommendations of the report were left unrealized. 

By 1918, Australia’s party system had evolved again. The two largest parties were the governing Nationalist Party and the opposition Labor Party. The Country Party (dedicated to championing the interests of rural and small-town Australians) was also on the rise, and threatened to siphon center-right votes from the Nationalist Party. In 1918, the Nationalist government sought to insulate itself from the spoiler effect by passing instant runoff voting for House elections and block preferential voting (a winner-take-all form of RCV) for Senate elections. A year later, and again in 1922, backbenchers introduced legislation to adopt PR for Senate elections. Both attempts to adopt PR were rejected by Parliament. 

In 1927, the Nationalist Party government established a “Royal Commission into the Constitution.” The Commission released its report in November 1929, recommending that the Senate electoral system be reformed to PR. Like the 1915 report, the recommendations were released soon after: 

• the conservative government which had established the Commission was defeated in an election. 
• an international crisis (World War I in 1915 and the October Wall Street Crash in 1929) redirected public attention. 

The Labor government that followed failed to act on the report’s recommendations. Controversy over the government’s response to the Great Depression once again shook Australia’s Party system, which reorganized such that the major parties were Labor and the United Australia Party.

Reform becomes attractive to the Labor Party

Key clauses in Australia’s Constitution limited the options available to an unpopular Labor government intent on protecting its members.

The Australian governments of the 1930s and early 40s were preoccupied with their response to the Depression and the existential threat posed by Japanese imperialism. In 1946, the Labor government was rewarded for their wartime management with a second landslide victory. 

However, the Labor Party’s fortunes reversed after the war as it committed to what it referred to as the “socialist objective.” The government maintained centralized wartime economic controls and attempted to nationalize all Australian banks. The conservative opposition described this agenda as a “communist ramp” and predicted a “coming dictatorship in Australia.” The High Court of Australia declared Labor’s actions unconstitutional because it was outside the scope of powers enumerated by the federal constitution. This episode, combined with mounting opposition to centralized economic controls, led to a fall in Labor’s popularity. It was clear the government would lose the next federal election.

Arthur Calwell, the Labor Party Minister of Information, now embraced the causes of enlarging Parliament and adopting PR for Senate elections as a means to save the jobs of Labor MPs and Senators. While Calwell and Labor were motivated by self-interest, this policy was only feasible because there had been significant cross-party support for PR over the previous half century. The cause was also aided by the structure of Australia’s Constitution. Parliament had remained the same size since federation (a 75 member House and a 36 member Senate). According to the Australian Constitution’s nexus clause, the number of House members must be “as nearly as practicable, twice the number of the senators.” The clause maintains a two-to-one ratio between House and Senate members, important in the event of a joint sitting of Parliament. Given that states are provided equal Senate representation, the clause is considered a check against the erosion of small state power by governments wanting to enlarge the House, but not the Senate. Joint sittings are provided for by the Australian Constitution in rare circumstances, and always following a double-dissolution election in which all House and Senate seats are contested.

By 1948, the enlargement of Parliament had been overdue for some time (see the graph above). Yet the nexus clause, combined with block voting rules for Senate elections, had deterred action. Governments realized that an enlarged Senate in which only one party was represented (under block voting) would undermine the credibility of the institution. There were only two viable options for a government wanting to increase the size of Parliament: 

• Combine this increase with a shift to PR in Senate elections. 
• Hold a referendum on abolishing the nexus clause, allowing an increase to the House without a Senate increase. 

Calwell convinced most Labor Senators (concerned that they would be wiped out in the next two federal elections) and many House members (particularly those representing swing-seats) to support his reform plans. Consequently, the Labor caucus decided to support proportional RCV in Senate elections, and to increase the number of Senators from 36 to 60. This meant increasing the size of the House from 75 to 120 members. The Labor government passed its reform agenda in 1948. As expected, Labor lost the subsequent 1949 election. Yet thanks to proportional RCV, Labor won 45% of contested Senate seats.

Proportional RCV expands

Australian states adopted proportional RCV for their upper houses, mirroring the successful federal Senate example

Proportional RCV proved popular. It has since been adopted for state upper house elections in South Australia, New South Wales, Western Australia, and Victoria. Proportional RCV continues to be used for Tasmanian lower chamber elections, and most states employ versions of proportional RCV for local government elections. American electoral reform campaigns can draw the following lessons from Australia’s half-century campaign for proportional RCV:

• Lay the groundwork (by conducting studies and raising awareness) well in advance. An unexpected confluence of events may present opportunities for change.
• Establish alliances with those working on other reforms, such as that forged between suffragettes and PR campaigners.
• By checking the government’s power, proportional RCV is consistent with classical liberalism. Lobby small government factions within center-right parties. Encourage these allies to discuss your reform agenda with small-c conservatives within their parties and organizations. These conservatives emphasize tradition and are wary of change.
• Use strains in the system to your advantage. These may relate to federalism, government branches, or even intra-party decision-making processes. Australia’s nexus clause, as well as statewide Senate elections provisions, narrowed the options available to an unpopular governing party. Prior to the late-1940s, there was less support on the Labor side of politics than on the center-right. Self-interest and having few viable alternatives flipped this paradigm.

About the author

Dr. Jesse Clark is a Research Analyst at FairVote. Before joining the Research Team, Jess studied political science at the University of Adelaide (South Australia) where he earned his Bachelor of Arts – First Class Honours (2013) and PhD (2018). Throughout his studies, Jess demonstrated a passion for electoral and constitutional reform as well as the histories and political development of Anglosphere countries. As an Australian immigrant to the U.S. he is highly knowledgeable about the “Washminster mutation’s” experience with RCV systems, including both proportional RCV and single-winner RCV